Current regulatory initiatives in the European Commission take a highly critical stance towards public service broadcasting. In the context of this development, the debate about the performance of the German PSBs in a competitive market environment is of some interest. The programmes broadcast by the German PSBs show a remarkable distinctiveness that runs contrary to the predictions of economic theory on programme choices which would rather expect a state of excessive similarity. Drawing on an in-depth case study of one of the major German public broadcasting corporations, it is argued that the distinctiveness of the public broadcasting programmes is the result of an interplay between institutional and organizational factors as well as of economic forces. These findings could have implications for regulatory debate about 'dual' television markets.
Introduction
European public service broadcasters (PSBs) are under increasing regulatory pressure from the European Commission (EC) to define their mission and to clarify their financial relationship with their national government. The Commission demonstrates once again its principal belief in the supremacy of market forces in order to achieve the common good. Consequently, in the vision of the EC for the audiovisual sector there does not seem to be much of a decisive role for the PSBs to play.
Although the European PSBs are barely comparable due to differing national regulations, in the context of the ongoing regulatory discourse at the European level the German convergence debate is of some interest. The convergence hypothesis dominated the German controversy surrounding the performance of the so-called 'dual' broadcasting system, made up of PSBs and commercial broadcasting companies (CBs), for more than a decade. Even after the slowdown of the scientific and political battles around the convergence theory, the general argument seems to have found its way into conventional wisdom about the dual system and continues to sap the legitimacy of the German PSBs. What makes the German convergence debate relevant for current struggles is that the argument is based on the economic models which account for the general mistrust of economists in the necessity of PSBs. This article tries to show that the programming strategies of the German PSBs do not fit into the convergence scenario. It also argues that in order to explain programme choices researchers have to abandon elegant but sterile models and open up their analytic focus to the complex relationship between PSBs and their organizational makeup. This could have serious implications for regulatory debate about the impact of PSBs in a competitive television market.
The German convergence hypothesis was first formulated by Wolfgang Schatz and his colleagues in 1989 (Schatz et al., 1989; Schatz, 1994) . It states that the entry of commercial competitors into the television market will force the incumbent PSBs to abandon their highquality programming profile and employ a strategy of subtle imitation in order to defend their market share, with the result that a state of excessive similarity and inefficient duplication of programmes with mass appeal will occur (see Figure 1) .
Despite the fact that the original convergence hypothesis predicts a mutual convergence of PSBs and CBs, it has mainly been employed to make accusations of self-commercialization and the sell-out of traditional PSB values, and has posed a serious threat to the legitimacy of the German PSBs (Krüger, 2001) .
A careful consideration shows that the convergence argument is primarily couched in conceptual terms and neglects important parameters of the competitive behaviour of broadcasters. This is mainly due to the limitations inherent in convergence theory. The convergence hypothesis was heavily inspired by the well-elaborated model of programme choice developed by Steiner (1952) . Although subsequent econometric research has criticized the Steiner model for its arbitrary simplifications and restrictive focus (see Owen and Wildman, 1992; Andersen and Coate, 2000) , German convergence debate has not given cognisance to developments in economic theory on programme choice. Thus, the theory does not take into account the relevance of programme costs and different institutional environments of broadcasting organizations. Furthermore, it assumes that audience preferences are homogeneous or near normally distributed. Convergence theory is also based on the assumption that market share is as important for PSBs as for profit-oriented television companies. The convergence hypothesis employs the well-known argument that PSBs have to maintain high market shares to justify the privilege of a special licence fee (Brown, 1996) .
Up until now, empirical support for the convergence hypothesis has remained rather mixed (see Schatz et al., 1989; Marcinkowski, 1991; Krüger, 1991 Krüger, , 1992 Krüger, , 2001 Nieland, 1992; Schatz, 1994; Merten, 1994 Merten, , 1996 Bruns and Marcinkowski, 1996; Bleicher, 1997) . While examination of programme structures shows remarkable differences between PSBs and CBs, convergence research has turned to ever more differentiated aspects of programme output and has found strong evidence for mutual imitation of programme formats. This has given rise to the idea that the German television market is shaped by a 'selective convergence' (Pfetsch, 1996; Marcinkowski and Bruns, 1996; Bleicher, 1997 ; for an international comparison, see Siune and Hultén, 1998) .
Despite the fact that this result can hardly be explained within the original framework of the convergence hypothesis, further discussion on the convergence theory has been aborted in favour of new scientific themes. Since the issue does not appear to be settled, this article argues that a revision of convergence theory is necessary and that it has to take into account those factors neglected by the original theory.
Convergence and distinctiveness in the ZDF
The following discussion is based on an in-depth case study of one of the premier German PSB corporations, the ZDF (Zweites Deutsches Fernsehen). The study employed approaches from organizational science as alternative theoretical concepts for research on the programming strategies of PSBs. Thirteen scheduling decisions made within the ZDF during the time period 1970-93 were examined. The project researched scheduling decisions because these decisions play a key role in organizational strategy (see also Ytreberg, 2002) . The main interest of the project was to examine the parameters surrounding scheduling decisions, the strategic goals of management and the impact of the ZDF's special executive structure on organizational strategy. The study was based on a methodology that is comparable to that employed by Hellmann (1999) . The primary data source for the study was extensive documentary research in the ZDF's internal files, supplemented by an examination of the relevant external developments which influenced organizational decision-making. Due to restricted access, internal files were only available until 1993. For more recent periods, additional interviews with key informants were conducted. Furthermore, the study investigated the coverage of the corporation's strategy in newspapers and news services specializing in media affairs from the 1970s to 2000.
The main reasons for choosing the ZDF were, first, its heavy dependence on advertising revenue; second, the national scope of its mandate put the corporation in sharp competition with the newly established CBs; and finally, because it is still one of the 'major players' in the German television marketplace. In 2001, the ZDF aired approximately 1.76 million minutes of television programmes on eight separate channels and it employed 3620 people. Its total revenue
amounted to 1.58 billion euros. Despite the significant decline in its ratings since the market entry of the CBs in 1984, the ZDF holds 15 percent of the market share and is still one of the four largest providers in the television market.
While the evidence gathered in this in-depth case study supports the argument that the convergence hypothesis fails to account for some of the major features of the ZDF's organizational strategy, the study also shows that the entry of the CBs into the market inspired the ZDF to imitate, in many ways, the programming strategies of the advertisingfinanced CBs (for a detailed analysis, see Meier, 2002) . Convergence theory was also confirmed by the finding that organizational self-interest has been the most important determinant in the ZDF's corporate strategy. According to the results of the study, the ZDF's executive management is not driven by a superior mission unaffected by market pressures, but instead is dedicated to securing the long-term survival of the organization.
The executive management, together with the scheduling unit, persistently strive to secure high rankings for the ZDF within the audience and advertising markets. To attain this goal, the ZDF has strengthened its entertainment programme output. It invests heavily in fictional genres and sports programmes and places them in the primetime slots. In return, cultural, experimental and minority programmes have been reduced and all genres have been forced to serve the defence of the corporation's ratings. The programme structure has lost its additive character and has been increasingly built on the well-known principles of audience flow and counterprogramming. 1 The management has standardized the programme schedules: in scheduler's jargon, it has 'stripped the slots', and tries to focus on the development of 'programme brands'. In turn, the scheduling unit works to get rid of special programmes that do not fit into such a branding strategy. Programme coordination with the first national public broadcaster, ARD 1, 2 was abandoned in favour of a highly competitive relationship. More recently, the ZDF has started to diversify its output and has established special channels to catch up with multichannel television and the trend towards audience fragmentation.
Simultaneously, management has expanded its decision-making remit and reduced the influence of the Broadcasting Council. Within the organization, a 'managerial revolution' typical for PSBs facing growing competition (e.g. Ferrell Lowe and Alm, 1997) could be observed. The operational core of the ZDF has been increasingly marketized. Scheduling decisions are increasingly based on more sophisticated techniques of audience research. Like PSBs in other countries, the ZDF implemented a a The data were collected on behalf of the PSBs. Therefore, the data collection is presumed to be biased in favour of the PSBs. In fact, the sample of programme weeks examined systematically leaves out big sport events (Krüger, 1992) . This seems not to be justified because big sports events occupy a large portion of the programme schedule and contribute considerably to the market share of the PSBs. Even with this constraint, the data seem to catch an essential feature of German programme structures. German programme research is unanimous in stating that the PSBs outstrip their commercial competitors when it comes to absolute volume of information programme output and the diversity of information titles. RTL, SAT. 1 and Pro 7 are the ZDF's main commercial competitors. Sat. 1 and Pro 7 belong to the now insolvent Kirch-Group. RTL, formerly known as RTL plus, is the German and most profitable subsidiary of the RTL Group.
scheduling-oriented culture, where the schedules are no longer made to fit the programme contents but programmes are made to fit the schedule (see Hellmann, 1999) . The planning process has been increasingly formalized, and in such a way that a power shift has taken place in favour of the schedulers, who have become a powerful planning unit and define rating targets and programme costs.
Despite the strong support for the convergence hypothesis, this study also shows the limitations of this approach. It has already been noted that the German PSBs try to balance distinctiveness with market share (McKinsey and Company, 1999) . The ZDF itself has tried to develop a market strategy for which the slogan 'ratings through quality' has been coined (e.g. Stolte, 1996; Schächter, 1998) . While the notion of 'quality' in management discussion remains rather vague and ambiguous, the ZDF's differentiation strategy has always emphasized the importance of maintaining a high proportion of informational programmes in the schedule. The ZDF management has defined the entrepreneurial success of the organization as defence of ratings and maintaining an informationoriented channel profile (Stolte, 1996; Schächter, 1996 Schächter, , 1998 . Longitudinal data show that this is not wishful thinking. Quite contrary to the predictions of convergence theory, the ZDF has not only strengthened its entertainment genres and sports programmes, but the strategic relevance of information programming has also grown (see Figures 2a and 2b ).
This finding begs the question, what factors account for the obvious distinctiveness between the German PSBs and their commercial counterparts? The following discussion suggests that this distinction is decided by a set of factors which are neglected by convergence theory. In sum, it is argued that in a competitive marketplace, 'organization matters' in different ways when it comes to programming strategies.
Determinants of the PSBs' distinctiveness
The evidence of our case study suggests that the scheduling decisions of the ZDF are made according to a complex interplay of political, organizational and market factors. The organizational strategy of the ZDF is rooted in a concrete web of specific organizational relations which have to be taken into account in order to reach a valid understanding of programming choices in a dual television market. The following discussion points to the most important factors affecting the strategic choice of the ZDF's management. The argument surely lacks the charming parsimony of the convergence hypothesis, but its primary goal
is not to maximize theoretical coherence but to draw a more versatile picture of the dynamics between PSBs and CBs.
Political dependence and normative pressure
The German PSBs are embedded in a very complex governance structure where a large number of players with competing policy goals are involved and where the distribution of authority among them is not absolutely clear. The authority for regulating the broadcasting sectors lies with the 16 German states (Länder) and not with the federal government. German media policy has to be formulated in a multilateral bargaining setting with 16 veto holders. Therefore policy formation is generally achieved in an incremental style and often reflects only minimal consensus (Schneider, 2001 ). In addition, German media policy is shaped by a considerable degree of judicial activity exercised by the Federal Constitutional Court (FCC). To date, the constitutional guarantees of the FCC have protected the German PSBs from a fate similar to that of their counterparts abroad -that of politically supported decline. Programme autonomy, as the German label for the independence of broadcasting, has become the central doctrine of German broadcasting law because the FCC does not regard broadcasting to be a business. Instead, the judges have taken a highly interventionist stance towards broadcasting. The court has ruled that the democratic functions of broadcasting require its complete independence from political pressure and that there should be a strong PSB sector (BVerfGE 12, 205) .
Consequently, German PSBs operate as autonomous corporate bodies without being under the direct control of the government (HoffmannRiem, 1997). Governmental control is restricted to legal overview and the FCC has increasingly restricted legislative competencies in matters of the PSBs' mission. Moreover, in 1991, the court granted the PSBs the right to engage in new media technology and programme forms in order to secure the fulfilment of their mission under changing circumstances (BVerfGE 83, 238) . In 1994, the FCC eventually ruled that the procedure for determining the licence fee had to be 'government-free' and that the licence fee should not be used as a means for political ends. The PSBs were thus granted a favourable position in the procedure determining the licence fee (BVerfGE 90, 60) . From 1994, programme autonomy was to be understood as the prerogative of the PSBs to interpret their mission (Libertus, 2002) .
Despite the FCC's continued efforts to strengthen the PSBs' programme autonomy, their political dependence could not be completely negated. Political claims remain relevant to the strategy of the PSBs. This is primarily due to the constitutional judicature itself. Constitutional case law has, in fact, left the question open as to what the limits and prerogatives of the PSBs are. While emphasizing programme autonomy, the FCC also declared on several occasions that the legislatures possess a certain degree of independent discretion in interpreting this mission (BVerfGE 83, 238; BVerfGE 87, 181) . In so doing, the court has created a legal problem that poses no end of difficulty. How to draw the line between the prerogative of the PSBs and the legitimate scope of governments to define the PSBs' mandate remains an issue of much controversy among legal experts (Holznagel, 1999; Eifert, 1999) .
Thanks to recent developments, the problem of defining their mandate has taken on renewed importance. The PSBs are presently trying to expand their organizational domain to include digital television and the Internet, so as to keep up with media development and audience behaviour. Despite the doctrine of programme autonomy, their claim remains highly controversial for two reasons. First, it is unclear as to how far a fragmented PSB offering -scattered among a number of channelscan contribute to social cohesion. Second, the nearly unlimited possibilities of new technology give rise to fears about the amount of additional funds necessary to pay for the required infrastructure and additional operating expenses. Furthermore, the highly critical stance of the EC towards unlimited expansion and state aid for the PSB sector (seen as likely to distort competition; see Harrision and Woods, 2001) forces the PSBs to seek political support at the national level. These developments have worked to strengthen the influence of the political stakeholders over the PSBs. Beside the question of mandate definition, state legislatures possess the authority to establish or to liquidate individual PSB corporations. This authority has been used to press for more efficiency in the PSB sector -a common goal among advocates and critics of the PSBs alike. Finally, politicians have always exerted influence over the PSBs because of their special executive structure. A widespread complaint concerning the boards of the German PSBs is that politicians have used their representation on these to suppress critical media coverage of their parties or governments (for an overview, see Meier, 2001) .
For the purposes of this article, it is important to state that the PSBs remain dependent on political decision-making. In order to achieve their strategic goals, they have to expose themselves in public debate against their commercial rivals (Spallek, 2001) . In that public debate, visible performance differences between commercial and public broadcasters are decisive, as is the perceived indispensability of the PSBs for the political stakeholders. This is one of the main reasons why the German PSBs maintain an information-oriented programming schedule while simultaneously abandoning other elements of their mission. It is important to point out that the mission of the German PSBs is ill-defined and lacks clarity. Concrete performance targets can hardly be deduced from constitutional or statutory law. There are no clearly defined parameters for programming, only guidelines. Targets that require programmes with mass audience appeal compete with the need to offer a broad programme range and to satisfy minority tastes. Finally, most of the vague performance goals of the PSBs contradict their economic aims. The ZDF acquired 40 percent of its finance from advertising revenue, and it is plain to see that such a funding model is highly delicate for a PSB (Blumler, 1993) .
While the vagueness of the legal framework affords the German PSBs considerable freedom, the normative discourse on PSBs has almost exclusively focused on the democratic functions of television (Spallek, 2001) . Empirical programme studies have long been dominated by comparative research on the supply of information programmes by CBs and PSBs (Hoffmann-Riem, 1991) . This restricted scientific focus is surely the result of the fact that the fulfilment of the democratic functions of the PSBs can be comparatively easily measured by the share and scheduling of informational programmes. However, German communication research has had to realize that despite a remarkable body of literature emphasizing PSB values (see Blumler, 1992; Tracey, 1998; Atkinson and Raboy, 1997) , most of these values resist easy quantification and objective evaluation (Schatz and Schulz, 1992; McQuail, 1992; Breunig, 1999) . As a result, constitutional law and scientific discourse have focused their attention on the normative expectations of the PSBs with regard to the supply of information programmes. But the fact that information programmes, unlike cultural or minority genres, do indeed account for a remarkable proportion of the premier programmes of the PSBs seems primarily attributable to corresponding demands from the political stakeholders. Despite the fact that political consensus over broadcasting regulation is absent, the picture that emerges from the case study is that the expectations of the political stakeholders towards the PSBs converge in the demand for the supply of information programmes.
In general, German media policy is shaped by an amalgamation of differing political conceptions of the broadcasting sector, political self-interest and the political ambitions of the state government to develop a regional media industry (Gellner, 1990; Tonnemacher, 1996) . The German conservatives' drive for broadcasting deregulation in the 1970s and 1980s was motivated not only by neoliberal ideology but also by the perception that the conservatives had systematically been discriminated against by the PSBs' leftist journalists (Gellner, 1990) . After the CBs' entry onto the market, the political stakeholders discovered their common interest in maintaining their communication opportunities in television. Despite the conservatives' expectations to the contrary, the CBs have demonstrated only limited interest in political programming. Instead, their programme strategies support the general hypothesis that advertising-financed broadcasters face little incentive to engage in dissonant and controversial programme genres like political journalism (Kops, 1998; Sunstein, 1999) . Moreover, the market entry of the CBs has increasingly changed the framework for political communication. Commercial television does not work simply as a tool or mediator for the selfportrayal of political actors. Instead, it is primarily dedicated to the needs of its audience (Jarren, 2001) . This development has pushed the political parties in Germany towards greater professionalism, and is currently referred to as the 'Americanization of the election campaign' (Pfetsch, 2001; Holtz-Bacha, 2002) . Another result of the changing media environment for politicians is that the easily accessible media coverage by the PSBs seems to have caused a re-evaluation of the latter by politicians. Now, even the more market-oriented politicians, who press for a reduction in the number of PSBs, do not dispute the doctrine that the democratic functions of television necessitate an independent PSB sector. Therefore, it comes as no surprise that the prime ministers of the Länder have demanded a commitment from the PSBs for more information and cultural programmes during prime time (Morhaupt, 2001) .
So far, it can be concluded that the institutional environment of the ZDF forces the corporation to pay tribute to the heavily emphasized information function of television. This obligation can be seen to be visibly fulfilled by the large proportion of total programme output dedicated to information programming.
But it has to be noted that the institutional environment pushes the PSBs not only towards the pure public service elements of their complex goal system, but also towards their market goals. The incentives from the political environment remain ambiguous due mainly to the basic lack of consensus about the broadcasting order. The highly competitive strategy of the ZDF has been motivated by the uncertainty surrounding media policy. The ZDF management has always been under the shadow of an inescapable political debate on the structure and the size of the PSB sector. In the 1980s and the early 1990s, management fully expected that only one PSB premier channel would survive (Bartels, 1997) . When the corporation's advertising revenue declined in 1993, they feared this was the beginning of a downward spiral that would eventually lead to increased structural intervention in the PSB sector (Ring, 1993; Stolte, 1993) . In order to avoid becoming the object of political debate, the ZDF strengthened its strategic focus on revenue generation and mass-appeal programming.
The internal coalition as determinant of organizational strategy
The German discussion on the relevance of organizational parameters for media performance has focused almost exclusively on questions of journalistic responsibility and self-regulation in media organizations. In contrast, our case study supports the hypothesis that an organization of any substantial size, like the various PSB corporations, has to be understood as a complex social entity (Perrow, 1986) , where the structure of the 'internal coalition' has considerable impact on strategic choices at the organizational level (Child, 1972) .
Broadcasting corporations have to be understood as conflict-ridden bargaining systems because television programmes are produced by a highly decentralized process. The programme as the eventual output is shaped by creative and artistic contributions as well as by economic and production preconditions (Eastman, 1993; Eastman et al., 1999) . This high degree of division of labour is likely to cause an enormous power decentralization within the organization. In addition, television programmes are complex, heterogeneous and differentiated products. Communication research is widely in agreement that important aspects of the quality of television programmes cannot be easily measured in any objective way (McQuail, 1992) . Such a configuration of organizational factors makes it highly probable that the production process is handed over to the professional production team (Ouchi, 1980) . This argument has been supported by organizational research on the German PSBs, which revealed a high degree of power decentralization (Fix, 1988; BarthRenz, 1992) . But the internal power decentralization within the ZDF is not only the result of the necessary division of labour but also of the basic legal framework of the organization. The constitution for the ZDF (ZDFStaatsvertrag, or ZDF-StV for short) requires that the organization set up the Chefredaktion (news and factual programming department) as a distinct, journalistic-oriented sector. Like all top positions in the ZDF,
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the Chefredakteur, as the head of the news department, can only be appointed by agreement of the PSB's Administrative Council. That highly politicized body has always used its power to push the director to accept a configuration of management personnel which proportionally represents party membership (Prüsse, 1997) . This kind of recruiting for the upper echelons of the ZDF surely contributes to the high degree of power decentralization within the organization.
According to our case study, these intraorganizational factors account for the fact that the programme planning process is a multilateral decision process. The programme schedules of the German PSBs have to be understood as the result of intense internal bargaining. The various programming departments compete with one another to gain the most attractive slots and higher shares of programming time and programming budget. In the bargaining processes within the ZDF, the Chefredaktion, as the department responsible for information and factual programming, has always tried to ensure that 40 percent of total programming output is dedicated to informational programming. In some of the scheduling decisions studied, the programming departments were able to defeat management and the planning units and protect their programme shares in the ZDF schedule. Thus, the power decentralization within the ZDF circumvented a radical change of corporate strategy. The implementation of a highly competitive strategy by the scheduling unit went on for more than a decade within the ZDF. It took a major crisis, i.e. the drop in advertising revenue in 1993, to convince the programming departments of the requirement for a strategic change.
Audience segmentation and the formation of core audiences
As discussed earlier, convergence theory is based on the assumption of homogeneous and normally distributed audience preferences. Under this premise, duplication of programmes catering to the common denominator is to be expected as the result of the rational programming choices of broadcasters seeking audience maximization. According to audience research, this assumption of homogeneity fails to grasp important features of the German audience market. Furthermore, convergence theory is also based on the assumption that advertising-financed CBs seek the largest possible audience. This contradicts the now conventional wisdom that advertisers are not merely interested in the size of an audience but also in its demographics (Owen and Wildman, 1992) . Different audience segments are of different value to advertisers and hence for CBs dependent on advertising revenue. This has serious implications for the
programming strategies of advertising-financed broadcasters and marks an important difference from the PSBs. While CBs focus on the most profitable audience segments, the legitimacy and long-term survival of PSBs depends mainly on total audience shares, even though the PSBs are financed by advertising revenue and are worried about the 'dying out' of their audiences (Ring, 1998; Schächter, 2002) .
At first, the homogeneity assumption contradicts well-established theories of media development, that assume a natural trend towards the formation of heterogeneous audiences and a target-group-specific media product due to individualization and the differentiation of lifestyles (Hasebrink, 2001 ). This case study strongly supports the assumption that an increased programme supply results in audience fragmentation. The internal reports of the ZDF management show that audience behaviour in the dual television market was shaped by an increase in selective reception and a trend towards audience segmentation. Soon after the market entry of commercial competitors, television regained those consumers who had turned their backs on the medium after television lost its novelty appeal in the 1970s (Kiefer, 1992 (Kiefer, , 1996a . The growth in the range of programme choices resulted in a renewed interest in television but soon harmed the ratings of factual and cultural programmes. Before the market entry of CBs, the PSBs had been able to guide the audience towards more demanding programmes by slotting them in-between entertainment programmes. After the deregulation this strategy no longer worked (Frank et al. 1991) . Now, audience behaviour in the dual television market shows a steady domination of entertainment-oriented media use. Entertainment programming accounts for around 60 percent of television consumption (Gerhards et al., 1996 (Gerhards et al., , 2001 .
The deregulation of the German television market not only led to a dramatic decline in the market share of the public broadcasters due to the increased number of available programme choices (Figure 3 ), but it also exacerbated the existing tensions between the competing goals of the PSBs. The change in audience behaviour, that consisted mainly in the decline of political television consumption, made it more difficult for the public broadcasters to resolve their conflicting goals (Kiefer, 1996c) . Since the entertainment-oriented audience could no longer be 'forced' to watch more demanding programmes, the PSBs were put between a rock and a hard place. They could only fulfil normative expectations of their programming at the expense of a loss in market share. As the case study shows, this development accounts for the increasing imitation of 
commercial broadcasting strategies by the public broadcasters and strongly supports convergence theory. But this is only one side of the story. To take only the growth of entertainment-oriented television consumption into account neglects other important features of audience behaviour after deregulation. In the 1970s, television not only lost its entertainment-oriented and less educated viewers but also segments of its better educated audience (Kiefer, 1992) . The number of higher educated viewers of television increased after the market entry of CBs. As a result, television can no longer be regarded as the exclusive medium of the less educated classesit has become a medium that serves different purposes for different audiences (Kiefer, 1996a) .
While the hypothesis of the existence of a 'dual audience' is controversial among German scholars because of the differentiated audience behaviour of German viewers (Hasebrink and Krotz, 1996) , research into audience behaviour agrees that tastes are very unequally distributed among several demographic groups (Frank and Gerhard, 1993; Gerhards et al., 1998 Gerhards et al., , 1999 . The market entry of CBs has brought the latent audience segmentation to light and has exacerbated it because the various viewer segments have very different values for advertisers (Kiefer, 1996b (Kiefer, , 1996c . Because the advertising-financed CBs have focused almost exclusively on a target audience of between 14 and 49 years of age, which makes up only 40 percent of the total audience, the core audiences of public and commercial broadcasters are now characterized by sharply differing demographics (Kiefer, 1996a (Kiefer, , 1992 Kliment and Brunner, 1998; Ridder and Engel, 2001 ). The PSB core audience is, on average, older, better educated, works in better paid jobs and has a higher disposable income then the commercial core audience, but the main characteristic of the core PSB audience is its strong interest in political issues (Gerhards et al., 1996 (Gerhards et al., , 2001 ).
The existence a relatively stable core audience for the PSBs implies that the homogeneity assumption is mistaken. But the convergence hypothesis not only fails to take into consideration the real differences in viewers' tastes, it also seems to neglect the character of television as a socalled 'reputational' good. This can best be illustrated by the distribution of different functional expectations regarding PSBs and CBs in the German television market. As was seen in Figure 1 , the use of PSB channels is shaped by informational genres, while the use of CBs shows the clear dominance of entertainment genres (see Gerhards et al., 1996 Gerhards et al., , 2001 . These differing functional expectations are reflected at the level of the reputations of the strategic groups. PSB channels are regarded as information suppliers while CBs are valued as experts in entertainment and undemanding fictional programmes Kayser, 2000, 2001) . Under the conditions of multi-channel television, German viewers have acted increasingly in accordance with their images of the channels which correspond to the gratifications they seek (Darschin and Frank, 1997; Hasebrink, 2001) . Therefore images have become of increasing relevance for ratings and eventually for the programming strategies of broadcasters. For broadcasters it is only natural to use channel images as starting points for distinct programming strategies (Kiefer, 1992) , even though reputations can cause precarious 'lock in' effects. In this way, PSB programmes that are not dedicated to their core audience are barely appreciated by the desired target groups (Wöste, 1999) .
For the purposes of this article, it is only relevant to note that the competitive audience market does not create incentives exclusively towards a growing convergence between the PSBs and CBs. On the contrary, PSBs have acquired a specific information-oriented reputation that is rewarded in the market by a true core audience. The PSBs have a considerable incentive to capitalize on their 'core competence' in order to stabilize their market share. Thus it can be concluded that the empirical development of the audience market shows a more complex pattern than convergence theory assumes. Nevertheless, the argument of a general trend of the dual television market towards differentiation should not be exaggerated: valid hypotheses regarding the influence of the audience market on the strategic behaviour of PSBs have pointed to the fact that the public core audience accounts for only 26 percent of the total audience (Kliment and Brunner, 1998) . Moreover, the PSB core audience is not composed of frequent viewers, and it is an audience which seems harder to please than the core audience of the CBs. Therefore, in order to defend their market share, the German PSBs have to attract viewers whose programme preferences are mixed, and accordingly employ a mixed strategy.
Furthermore, the argument presented here is not to deny that the German dual market, like any other competitive television market, is shaped by a trend towards mutual programme imitation. In contrast to convergence theory, which explains this market feature by homogenous audience preferences, it is argued that this imitation trend is caused by the uncertainty about 'real' audience preferences (see also Ang, 1991) . This uncertainty causes imitational strategies -in economics referred to as 'herd behaviour' -and leads to partial competitive convergence (Bielby and Bielby, 1994; Kennedy, 2002) . The simultaneous presence of differentiation incentives and imitational behaviour is another reason for
the parallel existence of the phenomena of convergence and divergence, or so-called 'selective convergence'.
The formation of heterogeneous resource bases
Recent research argues that differences in organizational strategy can often be explained by inter-firm resource heterogeneity (Jacobson, 1992) . This implies that, as far as the strategic choices of broadcasters are concerned, scholars have to look more at the resource bases of the broadcasters. In this manner, incentives for PSBs to employ differentiation strategies result not only from the audience market but also from the market for popular programmes, which has changed significantly since the market entry of CBs. The programme market changed from a classical demand market, where the PSBs executed a monopsony and could dictate prices, into a strongly competitive supply market. The bargaining power of licence holders has grown considerably (Friedrich, 1997) .
This development has led to an 'explosion' of the prices paid for films, top sporting events and television stars. At the same time, the terms of trade in the programme market have changed in favour of the programme producers and licence holders (Schwaderlapp, 1995; Friedrich, 1997) , e.g. the extraordinary importance of exclusive television coverage for top sports events has motivated licence holders as well as buyers to create an artificial scarcity of such coverage rights (Enderle, 2000) .
On the one hand, the drastic increase of programme prices has largely resulted from an improved television advertising market from which the CBs have benefited more than the PSBs. Before the market entry of CBs, an excessive demand for television advertising existed which the PSBs could not satisfy. The deregulation of the television market stimulated a long-enduring boom in the market for ad-spots. But the growth of the market was very unequally distributed. In fact, only the commercial competitors profited from the boom because, due to different regulations, they operate far more flexibly in the market for television advertising (ZDF, 1993a) . As a result, the programme budgets of the CBs drew level with the revenue of the PSBs in the early 1990s. The simultaneous decline in the advertising revenue of ARD and ZDF led to an increasing divergence between budgets and growing programme costs for the PSBs (Eifert and Hoffmann-Riem, 1999) . On the other hand, prices in the market for television programmes have increased due to the efforts of the CBs to attain image gains. Therefore, German CBs have
often paid prices for the rights to top sporting events which could scarcely be financed by advertising or Pay-TV revenue.
This escalation of programme prices has raised the relative attractiveness of the internal resource base of the broadcasting corporations. In comparison to external supply, internal production of programmes has become less expensive especially when the opportunities for selling the home-produced programmes are taken into account (Schöneberger, 1998) . Thus the price escalation in the market for popular television programmes is one of the main reasons why all German broadcasters have intensified their internal or contract production. In the context of this development the specific journalistic infrastructure of the PSBs has turned out to represent not only a considerable degree of fixed costs but also an inimitable strategic asset for the PSBs. That infrastructure, that consists among other things of a worldwide network of correspondents, is very unlikely to be copied by CBs seeking profits. CBs normally hesitate to invest in journalistic staff that will be a strain on the corporations' budget due to their high fixed costs. Instead, the commercial rivals of the PSBs have chosen to finance fictional productions or entertainment shows that fit the programme preferences of their preferred audience and can possibly be resold (see also Jarren, 2001) .
As a result, the CBs and PSBs have heterogeneous resource bases at their command, and this accounts for the enduring competence advantage of the PSBs in informational and cultural genres. In the decision processes studied, the management of the ZDF used this advantage to prevent its commercial competitors from entering into the traditional competence domains of public television. Now, with the market entry of commercial advertising-financed news channels (although not yet profitably operating), the situation seems more complicated, but for the purposes of this article it seems sufficient to argue that the specific internal resource configuration of the PSBs meets compatible expectations and competence attribution within the audience market. This constellation seems to justify the preliminary conclusion that the market for programmes also acts as an incentive for the specific differentiation strategy employed by the German PSBs.
Conclusion
The preceding discussion has tried to illustrate how a configuration of political, organizational and market factors specific to the PSBs interact in a way to force the PSBs to devote a remarkable share of their programmes to informational content. A comparative account of the
corporate strategy of the ZDF in the 1970s and the 1990s shows that specific public programmes have now acquired a much greater strategic relevance than during the public oligopoly. In the oligopoly phase, the corporate strategy of the ZDF was clearly dominated by entertainment genres. The ZDF found its audience primarily among the frequent television viewers and was honoured for its entertainment competence (Neumann, 1984) . This advantage soon fell victim to the aggressive competitive strategies of the commercial competitors, who were consequently far more able to focus on entertainment programmes. The result was that the ZDF sat in a competency trap. It could no longer act as an 'entertainment steam ship' (Unterhaltungsdampfer in ZDF jargon) and had to engage in strategic readjustment (Schächter, 1996) . While the ZDF has tried to defend its position in the genre of made for television films and family entertainment, the corporation has unquestionably strengthened its focus on information supply, because it lacks the budget for more sport programmes and more entertainment, but is able to outdo the CBs in the information genre.
While the argument suggests that the PSBs have established themselves in a relatively stable market niche, this has to be restricted to the differences between PSBs and CBs in information supply. For a comprehensive and dynamic account of programming strategies in a dual television market, much more research is needed. Furthermore, the preceding discussion deals only with the market phase of analogue multichannel television. With the advent of digital television, the situation will surely become more complex. The PSBs will need to work harder to retain a critical mass of viewers and they will probably employ new scheduling strategies to promote their emerging channel families (Ellis, 2000; Ytreberg, 2002) . This development will more than likely change the composition of the schedules of the individual channels, even when changes in supply, as well as in audience behaviour, proceed more slowly than business optimists predicted. Further events that are likely to have a major impact on corporate strategies in the German television market are the breakdown of the Kirch empire and the current recession in the German market for television advertising. These developments will probably work in favour of the German PSBs, which enjoy much more stable revenues.
The results of the case study and this discussion do not suggest that the public mission is the main and only guideline for the management of the PSBs. Since this is, for obvious reasons, the picture the PSBs like to draw, this article has tried to show that the distinctiveness of the German PSBs can be mainly explained through the organizational self-interest of the corporation. The complex organizational environment forces the German PSBs to pursue information-oriented programming strategies. Like other European PSBs, the German PSBs strive to satisfy the special expectations of public broadcasting while maintaining enough audience acceptance to protect themselves from political intervention. They do not hesitate to employ aggressive strategies to defend their market shares or to deter new competitors from market entry. Furthermore, this article has shown that their self-imposed obligation to maintain the informational functions of public broadcasting not only serves to reject criticism of the PSBs' strategy and to maintain political support, but that also the information-oriented programming strategy has been chosen because of strong market incentives to offer this kind of programme profile.
In sum, our discussion does not set out to deny the convergence trend at all; instead it attempts to hone the perspective on programming strategies in the dual television market by widening the analytical focus. A valid understanding of programming strategies in a competitive environment requires an in-depth perspective that takes the various interdependencies between the competitors into account.
What can be learned from the German case for current regulatory debate about the future of the PSBs within a competitive broadcasting sector is that policy initiatives must not be based on simplified, formal models. Contrary to theoretical predictions, the German PSBs have demonstrated that public television can successfully adapt to market forces and occupy a market position that guarantees it enough audience share and legitimacy to survive. The German PSBs not only offer programmes CBs are hardly expected to deliver, they also reach a remarkable proportion of the general audience with non-entertainment programmes. Maybe proponents of a pure market approach to television would suggest that the market niche of the PSBs could also be occupied by CBs -if only unnecessary restraints were abandoned. Against this expectation it can be argued that it seems highly unlikely that without the long enduring existence of the German PSBs there would be such a market niche at all. The very existence of a sufficiently large, yet ageing, audience segment whose viewing preferences are geared towards information programmes appears to be in itself a product of the 'socializing' efforts of the PSBs during the oligopoly phase. Over the years the German PSBs have shaped audience preferences with a long-lasting effect, so that now they can capitalize on them.
To formulate more general hypotheses about programming strategies of PSBs in competitive environments would require a comparative cross-national account of European PSBs. A first step towards such a project was undertaken by Ytreberg (2002) , who has focused exclusively on the Scandinavian experience, yet much more research is needed.
Notes

